Letter from Susuhunan Amangkurat II in Kartasura to the Supreme Government in Batavia, 18 December 1699

Introduced M. C. Ricklefs, Professor Emeritus, The Australian National University

M. C. Ricklefs, “Letter from Susuhunan Amangkurat II in Kartasura to the Supreme Government in Batavia, 18 December 1699”. In: Harta Karun. Hidden Treasures on Indonesian and Asian-European History from the VOC Archives in Jakarta, document 14. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2014.

BY M. C. RICKLEFS

This letter was written by Susuhunan Amangkurat II (r. 1677-1703) in dire circumstances, his control over his court and kingdom being in an advanced state of collapse. As indicated in Harta Karun document 13, the hostility and diplomatic impasse between the VOC and the court of Kartasura were almost total; of reconciliation there was little hope and, from the VOC side, probably no real expectation.

Within the court, cliques and rivalries were increasingly bitter and dangerous. In the east of the kingdom, Surapati had carved out an independent domain centred on Pasuruan. In 1698-9 he was able to raid as far west as Madiun and Ponorogo. Farther east, the once-independent kingdom of Balambangan was conquered by the Balinese lord Gusti Panji Sakti of Buleleng in 1697, evidently in alliance with Surapati. In Surabaya, the local lord, Angabei Jangrana II, was operating largely independently and repairing the city’s defensive walls in case of attack. The Madurese lord Cakraningrat II’s loyalty to Kartasura was doubtful, and at best limited.

It was in this context that Amangkurat II wrote the following letter to the Governor-General of the VOC and the Council of the Indies in Batavia in December 1699.

Here the king wrote of the threat of Surapati – whom the VOC had been trying to get Amangkurat II to capture or kill since he had murdered some seventy-five VOC soldiers including Captain François Tack at the court in 1686.

Amangkurat II’s letter claimed that Surapati had 800 soldiers armed with snaphaenen. This was the latest form of musket which was being introduced into Java in this period – the English term is snaphance. It used a flintlock firing mechanism rather than the older matchlock. This new firing mechanism, along with pre-packaged paper cartridges (also introduced in this period), significantly increased the reliability, rate and accuracy of infantry fire. It is highly unlikely (as the Company would have known) that Surapati already had 800 such weapons. They were occasionally presented as gifts by the VOC, as shown in this letter, in which the king acknowledged receiving a gilded pair of snaphaenen (probably in the form of pistols rather than muskets).

It is not clear how much of this story about the threat of Surapati was true. The VOC was disinclined to give any credence to whatever was said by Amangkurat II. And, in fact, Surapati never attacked either Kartasura or Surabaya.

The king sought VOC military support and said that, after the impending conflict was over, he would send a negotiator to Batavia. The Company was accustomed to such promises and had no interest in responding to the king’s requests.

Throughout 1700 and 1701 the diplomatic impasse continued with various promises of negotiations or embassies, but nothing happened. According to another VOC source, among the gifts that the Company sent to the king at this time were some portraits, which inspired a joke among Kartasura courtiers that instead of soldiers the VOC was sending puppets. One difficulty in the way of any real negotiations may have been a fear among the king’s dignitaries that, if they were sent as emissaries to Batavia, they might be murdered in revenge for the killing of Tack in 1686. No real negotiations took place down to the death of Amangkurat II in November 1703.

Reference:

M. C. Ricklefs. War, Culture and Economy in Java, 1677–1726: Asian and European Imperialism in the Early Kartasura period. Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen and Unwin, 1993.